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Abstract
Research on future-oriented cognition in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) has primarily 
focused on worry, while less is known about the role of episodic future thinking (EFT), an 
imagery-based cognitive process. To characterize EFT in this disorder, we used the experimental 
recombination procedure, in which 21 GAD and 19 healthy participants simulated positive, 
neutral and negative novel future events either once or repeatedly, and rated their 
phenomenological experience of EFT. Results showed that healthy controls spontaneously 
generated more detailed EFT over repeated simulations. Both groups found EFT easier to generate 
after repeated simulations, except when GAD participants simulated positive events. They also 
perceived higher plausibility of negative—not positive or neutral—future events than did controls. 
These results demonstrate a negativity bias in GAD individuals’ episodic future cognition, and 
suggest their relative deficit in generating vivid EFT. We discuss implications for the theory and 
treatment of GAD.
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1. Introduction
Over the past 30 years, considerable research has aimed to elucidate the relation of anxiety 
to future thinking (Miloyan, Pachana, & Suddendorf, 2014). Perhaps one of the most reliable 
findings to emerge from this literature is the heightened fluency with which anxious 
individuals, both clinical and non-clinical, think about negative future events. For instance, 
compared to non-anxious individuals, anxious ones find it easier to generate negative future 
events (e.g., MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & Jacobsen, 1997), to 
generate reasons why those negative events might happen (e.g., MacLeod, Williams, & 
Bekerian, 1991), and tend to believe that those negative events are more likely to occur in 
the future (e.g., MacLeod, Byrne, & Valentine, 1996).
In this study, we focus on generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), a psychiatric condition 
primarily characterized by persistent and excessive worry about the future (DSM-5; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Dugas and colleagues’ model of GAD emphasizes 
intolerance of uncertainty and maladaptive beliefs (e.g., “worry helps me to plan for the 
future”; Dugas et al., 1998), which feed into worry, the central feature of the disorder. 
Although worry has been studied extensively in GAD, there has been no explicit 
investigation of episodic future-oriented thinking— imagining or simulating personal 
experiences that may take place in the future (Atance & O'Neil, 2001). In the general 
population, episodic future thinking (EFT) constitutes a substantial portion of cognitive 
activity (Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2008; D'Argembeau, Renaud & van der Linden, 2011), 
and helps us to plan for future situations, facilitate goal-attainment, and improve coping 
(Schacter, 2012; Szpunar, 2010). It is an important cognitive process in all populations, and 
alongside worry, EFT may also be a part of the future-oriented cognitive milieu of GAD. A 
more complete understanding of future-oriented thinking in GAD requires the examination 
of EFT in this population.
It is important to highlight the possible distinction between worry and EFT, which is 
potentially important for understanding future thinking in GAD. Worry in the context of 
GAD is a type of future-oriented thinking style analogous to rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Wisco & Lyubomirsky, 2008), involving negative content in predominantly general and 
abstract verbal loops, lacking specific and concrete details (Dugas et al., 1998). Both Dugas 
and colleagues’ (1998) and Borkovec & Inz's (1990) models of GAD conceptualize worry as 
an avoidance strategy that distracts one from physiological reactions to fear provoking 
imagery. That is, worriers worry in order to avoid the vivid experience of negative 
emotional material (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002); by spontaneously engaging in worrying, 
individuals with GAD rely on abstract semantic material to distract from concrete 
simulations of events (i.e., EFT) that may bring about physiological symptoms (Borkovec, 
Alcaine & Behar, 2004; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Tucker & Newman, 1981). In support of this 
model, there is evidence that worrisome thoughts are less concrete (e.g., Stöber & Borkovec, 
2002), people experience less imagery when worrying (e.g., Paivio, 1986), generating 
imagery is more distressing than generating verbal material about a worrisome event 
(Nelson & Harvey, 2002), and worrying suppresses heart rate increases in the face of social 
stress, hindering full emotional processing (e.g., Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec, 
Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993; Newman, Llera, Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguay, 
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2013; Peasley-Milkus & Vrana, 2000). In contrast to worrying, EFT is a future-oriented 
thinking style that relies on concrete imagery and specific details—the very cognitive 
features that worry is theorized to work against. Currently, we do not know whether and 
how episodic future events are processed in GAD, because research has focused on more 
abstract future thinking (i.e. worry). Given the prominence of EFT as a cognitive process in 
general, as well as the fact that worry and EFT may be competing processes, a better 
understanding of EFT in GAD may contribute to the theory and treatment of excessive 
worry.
We were therefore motivated to characterize EFT in individuals with GAD. Specific 
questions included: 1) Are individuals with GAD any more or less able to engage in EFT 
than healthy individuals, and if so, is their ability modulated by emotional valence? 2) Are 
there differences between how healthy and GAD individuals perceive the plausibility of 
simulated events? 3) Given that repeated thoughts about the future enhance the perceived 
likelihood or plausibility of occurrence of events (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Carroll, 1978; 
Szpunar & Schacter, 2013), does repeated simulation about a specific event increase GAD 
individuals’ perception of its plausibility?
Another aim of the present study was to address a methodological concern in the clinical 
future thinking literature. A limitation of prior work is that little or no control was exerted 
over the frequency with which people may have thought about particular events before 
entering a laboratory setting (e.g., Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquin, 2008; Behar et al., 2012; 
MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). It remains unclear whether findings of negative bias in future 
thinking arise from a general bias (e.g., “my financial future will always be bleak”), or from 
an accumulation of past worrying experiences about this particular event (e.g., worrying 
about paying bills each month). Therefore, a secondary motivation for the present study was 
to examine anxious individuals’ processing of novel future events, so that their ratings 
reflect cognitive tendencies rather than past experience.
Based on prior models of GAD, in which verbal-linguistic processing is used to dampen 
vivid simulation of feared future events (for a recent review, see Behar, DiMarco, Hekler, 
Mohlman, & Staples, 2009), we predicted individuals with GAD to simulate future events 
with less detail, ease, and arousal than healthy individuals (i.e., they would be less able to 
generate vivid events), especially for negative future events. We also predicted that 
individuals with GAD would selectively rate negative events, and not neutral or positive 
events, as more plausible than would controls, based on previous findings that anxious 
individuals perceive the future more pessimistically (Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquin, 2008). 
We finally predicted that repeated simulations of negative future events would increase 
GAD individuals’ perception of their plausibility, more so than for healthy individuals.
2. Material and methods
2.1 Participants
Participants were 40 adults recruited from the Boston community via flyers and online 
bulletin boards. Those for the GAD group and control group were recruited using separate 
materials advertising for worriers and healthy volunteers, respectively. To determine 
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eligibility, participants were first administered a 10-minute phone screen to assess for 
inclusion and exclusion criteria. If eligible, potential participants were invited to the 
laboratory, where they provided written consent in a manner approved by Boston 
University's (BU) institutional review board. A doctoral-level student clinician then 
conducted a diagnostic assessment with all potential participants to determine the presence 
or absence of GAD diagnosis. Individuals were excluded and debriefed if they failed to meet 
inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Twenty-one participants met DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for GAD, and 19 did not. They were 
70% female, with ages ranging from 18 to 60; there were no differences between the GAD 
group and the control group in age, t(38) = 0.50, p = .62., gender, χ2(1, N = 40) = 0.84, p = .
55, or level of education, χ2(1, N = 40) = 0.90, p = .58 (Table 1). Potential participants were 
excluded if they were younger than 18 years of age, met diagnostic criteria for a serious 
psychiatric disorder (including bipolar disorder, psychotic disorders and substance use 
disorders), or had cognitive deficits that precluded them from adequately following 
experimental instructions. Depression and other anxiety symptoms were allowed for all 
participants, as long as GAD was the principal diagnosis for those in the GAD group, and 
GAD (clinical or subclinical) was absent from those in the control group. None of the 
participants in the control group met diagnostic criteria for any psychiatric disorders.
2.2 Measures
The clinical interview consisted of the Anxiety and Related Disorders Interview Schedule – 
Fifth Edition (ADIS-5, Brown & Barlow, 2013), a semi-structured, clinician-administered 
diagnostic interview that assesses presence of anxiety-related psychological disorders. In 
addition, the following self-report instruments were administered:
Demographics Questionnaire—a brief questionnaire of subjects’ age, sex, handedness, 
ethnicity/race, marital status, education level, and occupational status.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990)—a 
widely used, 16-item questionnaire that assesses worry-related GAD symptoms on 5-point 
Likert scales that reflect participants’ level of agreement with symptom statements. This 
self-report instrument has demonstrated high internal consistency (α = .86–.95) and test-
retest reliability (r = .74–.93; Molina & Borkovec, 1994).
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988)—a widely used, 21-
item questionnaire that assesses severity of physiological and emotional anxiety symptoms 
in the past week, based on Likert scales of 0-3. This self-report instrument has demonstrated 
high internal consistency (α = .92) and test-retest reliability (r = .75; Beck, Epstein, Brown, 
& Steer, 1988).
2.3 Procedure
After participants completed the clinical interview and the self-report questionnaires, we 
administered the experimental recombination procedure, which uses details from the 
participant's life to ensure that they simulate novel events that could take place in their 
future (Addis et al., 2009; Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010; Szpunar, Addis, & 
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Schacter, 2012). This procedure consisted of 3-sessions spanning approximately one week in 
duration.
Session 1—A research assistant guided participants in generating lists of 110 familiar 
people (first and last names of people known in real life), 110 familiar places (specific 
locations that participants had previously visited, e.g., “New England Aquarium”), and 110 
familiar objects (objects participants could imagine physically carrying with them in various 
locations, e.g., “teddy bear”). Participants were instructed to select locations that were 
specific (e.g., “Boston” would be too general), and to select objects that were portable (e.g., 
“bed” would be unacceptable). The duration of this first session was approximately 3 hours. 
After participants left the laboratory, we examined the generated lists for quality based on 
the above specifications. The first 93 items meeting specification from each of the three lists 
(i.e., people, places, and objects) were selected and randomly combined to create 93 person-
location-object triads to serve as simulation cues to be used in Session 2 (e.g., John Doe + 
Barnes and Noble bookstore + eyeglasses).
Session 2—Session 2 occurred one week after Session 1 and lasted approximately 1 hour. 
During this session, participants were asked to “imagine as vividly as possible” hypothetical 
experiences in response to their idiosyncratic simulation cues. Each participant first 
completed three practice trials. For each practice trial, participants were presented with one 
of three valence tags (positive, negative or neutral) accompanied by a unique person-
location-object triad, (e.g., John Doe + Barnes and Noble bookstore + eyeglasses). They 
were allotted 12.5 s to simulate an experience that could occur within the next 5 years, that 
involved interacting with the specified person in the specified location in a manner that 
involved the specified object, and that would evoke the emotion specified by the valence 
tag. Participants were instructed to generate a detailed episodic experience for each cue and 
to “do their best in imagining what it would be like.” After doing so, they typed a brief one-
sentence description of the generated event before moving onto the next simulation cue 
(e.g., “I ran into John Doe at the Barnes & Noble bookstore and he said my new glasses are 
ugly”). During the three practice trials, participants worked together with the experimenter 
to make sure that they understood all instructions. After the practice trials, participants 
completed 90 additional trials (30 positive, 30 neutral and 30 negative) independently, 
prompted by a computer program. The positive, negative, and neutral valence tags and 
simulation cues were presented in random order. Cues were presented with E-Prime 
software Version 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) on a desktop monitor, 
and participants used a keyboard to enter their event descriptions.
Session 3—On the day immediately following Session 2, participants returned to the 
laboratory for a final visit lasting approximately 1.5 hours. During this session, participants 
first re-simulated half of the previously generated events (15 positive, 15 negative, and 15 
neutral, randomly selected) three times each in random order. Each of the 135 trials was 
performed in the same manner as in Visit 2, with the following exception. In order to ensure 
that participants simulated the same events they had generated the day before, each trial 
featured a valence tag, a person-location-object-triad, and the participants’ previously 
generated one sentence description. Participants were instructed to simulate each event as 
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they had the previous day without generating additional details. After a 10-minute break, 
participants were told that they would re-simulate all 90 events one more time (30 positive, 
30 negative, 30 neutral; half simulated for the first time that day and half simulated for the 
fourth time; presented in random order and completed in the same manner as simulations 
carried out in Session 2), and that after each trial they would be required to (1) specify 
whether or not each event had been simulated ten minutes earlier (i.e., yes/no recognition) 
and (2) complete five phenomenological ratings about the simulated event, each on a 5-point 
scale: a) plausibility (1 = very implausible, 5 = very plausible); b) detail (1 = few details, 5 = 
many details); c) ease of simulation (1= very difficult, 5 = very easy); d) valence (1 = very 
negative, 5 = very positive); and e) arousal (1 = very calming, 5 = very arousing). The order 
in which these five phenomenological ratings were made was random across participants.
We note that the yes/no recognition test served as a cover story to obscure our intention to 
assess the effects of repeated simulation on plausibility and other phenomenological ratings. 
Participants used a keyboard to make their memory judgments and phenomenological 
ratings. Participants were debriefed and compensated for their time.
By only asking participants to make phenomenological ratings once (i.e., at the end of the 
experiment), we were able to avoid potential biases associated with rating the same event 
multiple times (e.g., participants may attempt to remember prior ratings of an event when 
making subsequent ratings). Also, although participants simulated events once or four times 
on the day that phenomenological ratings were collected, each event had been simulated 
once the day before, when brief descriptions of these events were first generated. Hence, 
distinct sets of events were simulated twice or five times, but once or four times on the day 
of the critical manipulation.
2.4 Data Analysis
The experiment involved a 2 (Group: GAD vs. healthy controls) × 2 (Repetition: One vs. 
four simulations on the final day of the experiment) × 3 (Emotion: positive, neutral, 
negative) design. Group was a between-subject factor, and Repetition and Emotion were 
within-subject factors. Primary outcomes were participants’ subjective ratings of detail, ease 
of simulation, arousal, and plausibility. Separate repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) were conducted for each of the main outcome variables. Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals (95% CI) reflect unstandardized mean differences, as all outcomes are 
reported on the same scale. Cohen's d was calculated using standard deviation (SD) of paired 
mean differences for within-group t-tests, and using SD of healthy control group means for 
independent sample t-tests.
3. Results
Table 2 presents the mean ratings for positive, negative, and neutral simulations of future 
events as a function of group membership and repetition. A manipulation check using 
ratings of valence showed that participants generated EFTs with appropriate valence tags. 
That is, positive (M = 3.67) events were rated as more positive than negative (M = 2.22) and 
neutral (M = 3.20) events, t(39) = 12.30, p < .001, 95% CI [1.213, 1.691], d = 1.945 and 
t(39) = 7.57, p < .001, 95% CI [0.346, 0.593], d = 1.214, respectively; neutral events were 
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also rated as more positive than negative events, t(39) = 11.73, p < .001, 95% CI [0.812, 
1.151], d = 1.855. The recognition memory test yielded high levels of accuracy in the GAD 
group (M = 90.90%, SD = 15.06%) and the control group (M = 96.50%, SD = 4.55%), t(38) 
= 1.55, p = .13, d = −0.50, indicating that participants in both groups were paying adequate 
attention to the task.
To test our prediction that individuals in the GAD group would generate less vivid 
simulations, repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted on the 
phenomenological ratings outcomes—detail level, ease of simulation and arousal. There 
were no main effects of group membership for any of these outcomes. However, there was a 
group by repetition interaction for ratings of detail level, F(1,38) = 5.79, p = .021, ηp2 = .
132, such that individuals with GAD exhibited smaller increases in detail with repeated 
simulation (MDIFFERENCE = 0.33) than controls (MDIFFERENCE = 0.76), t(38) = 2.35, p = .
026, 95% CI [0.168, 0.693], d = .627 (Figure 1). In addition, we found a three way 
interaction between group, emotion, and repetition for ease of simulation, F(2,76) = 6.19, p 
= .004, ηp2 = .132. Specifically, both groups found it easier to simulate repeated events than 
non-repeated events, with large effect sizes (0.82 < ds < 0.99, ps < .001), except when 
individuals with GAD simulated positive events, where the increase in ease ratings from 
non-repeated to repeated simulation had only a medium effect size and was not statistically 
significant, t(20) = 2.06, p = .06, 95% CI [0.004, 0.576], d = .449. As depicted in Figure 2, 
controls generally had a bigger increase in ease ratings from non-repeated to repeated 
simulations, but the difference between groups was particularly pronounced for positive 
events.
A repeated measures ANOVA also tested our predictions that the GAD group would 
selectively rate negative events as more plausible and increasingly so with repetition. Group 
interacted significantly with emotion for plausibility ratings, F(2,76) = 4.08, p = .025, ηp2 = .
180. As depicted in Figure 3, the difference in negative event ratings between the GAD 
group (M = 2.42) and the control group (M = 2.17) produced a medium effect size (d = .
459), which was significantly larger than the difference in positive (MGAD = 2.55 and 
MCONTROL = 2.59; d = .048) and neutral (MGAD = 2.66 and MCONTROL = 2.64; d = .089) 
event ratings. Exploratory Pearson's correlations found a positive relationship between 
participants’ average plausibility ratings and his/her average detail and ease ratings, r = .699, 
n = 40, p < .001, and r = .369, n = 40, p = .018, respectively. The plausibility “change score” 
(repeated - non repeated) was also positively related to detail and ease “change scores,” r = .
418, n = 40, p = .007, and r = .378, n = 40, p = .015, respectively.
Using the total sample, exploratory repeated measures ANOVAs showed a strong effect of 
emotion for ratings of detail, arousal, and plausibility, all Fs(2,76) > 9, ps < .001, ηp2's > .
34. Specifically, positive (M = 3.23) events were rated as more detailed than negative (M = 
3.04) and neutral (M = 3.09) events, t(39) = 3.84, p < .001, 95% CI [0.087, 0.283], d = .605 
and t(39) = 2.94, p = .006, 95% CI [0.046, 0.244], d = .469, respectively; positive (M = 1.79) 
and negative events (M = 2.32) were both rated as more arousing than neutral (M = 1.62) 
events, t(39) = 2.74, p = .009, 95% CI [0.045, 0.300], d = .433 and t(39) = 7.45, p < .001, 
95% CI [0.512, 0.893], d = 1.178, respectively; and negative events were rated as more 
arousing than positive events, t(39) = 6.40, p < .001, 95% CI [0.362, 0.697], d = 1.011. 
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Positive (M = 2.56) and neutral events (M = 2.67) were both rated as more plausible than 
negative events (M = 2.30), t(39) = 4.82, p < .001, 95% CI [0.155, 0.379], d = .761 and t(39) 
= 6.41, p < .001, 95% CI [0.488, 0.253], d = 1.010, respectively. There were no significant 
main effects of emotion for ease of simulation, F(2,76) = 2.25, p = .12, ηp2 = .108. There 
was also a main effect of repetition such that future events simulated four times were rated 
as more detailed, easy to simulate, positive, and plausible than future events simulated only 
once, all Fs(2,38) > 8.80, ps < .005, ηp2's > .185. There was no effect of repetition on ratings 
of arousal, F(2,76) < 0.01, p = .96.
4. Discussion
We made use of a novel experimental recombination procedure in order to characterize the 
way individuals with GAD engage in episodic simulation of novel, personalized future 
events, in terms of vividness and plausibility. The current study extends previous research 
on future thinking and anxiety in several ways. We instructed and gave opportunity for 
participants to engage in truly episodic simulation, measuring both phenomenological 
ratings and ratings of perceived plausibility; we also ensured that each participant had 
personalized, novel events to simulate, in order to control for familiarity with experimental 
stimuli. Moreover, this is the first study to examine EFT in a GAD sample. We predicted 
that individuals with GAD would simulate future events less vividly (i.e., with less detail, 
ease, and arousal) than non-anxious individuals, especially for negative future events; on the 
other hand, we also predicted that they would rate negative events as more plausible than 
controls. Lastly, we predicted that repeatedly simulating negative future events would make 
GAD individuals rate them as more plausible, to a greater extent than non-anxious 
individuals.
The findings in control participants largely replicated a previous study using the 
experimental recombination procedure in healthy individuals (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). 
Findings also partially supported our specific hypotheses. We did not find main group 
differences in vividness or quality of simulations (i.e., level of detail, ease of simulation, and 
arousal). However, we found that the GAD group showed less increase in detail after 
repeated simulations than individuals without GAD. Notably, non-anxious participants 
spontaneously added details to simulations even though they were instructed not to do so, 
similar to previous findings in a healthy sample (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013), while GAD 
participants did this to a significantly lesser extent. The above interaction between group and 
frequency of simulation may point to a deficit in continuing to generate concrete details 
about a future event after the initial conception. Although future work is needed to expand 
on this preliminary data, this finding is generally in keeping with prior research 
demonstrating relatively impoverished future thinking in individuals with GAD (Stöber 
1998; Stöber 2000; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002).
Our results also showed that those with GAD also showed a relatively dampened increase in 
ease of simulation for positive events after repetition, relative to controls. Whereas the vast 
majority of prior work has focused on the manner in which individuals with GAD process 
negative future events (Behar, DiMarco, Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009), the above 
results indicate that it is also important to consider the manner in which individuals with 
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GAD think about positive future events. Although both groups rated positive events as 
coming to mind more easily than negative events following a single simulation, this 
difference was not present after repeated simulation for individuals with GAD. Hence, this 
finding highlights the need for work that emphasizes deficits of positive cognitions in 
anxiety disorders (Byrne & MacLeod, 1997; MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, Carroll, & Hunter, 
1997). Overall, in characterizing the vividness of EFT in individuals with GAD, our findings 
suggest that although they are generally able to engage in EFT in a manner similar to that of 
non-anxious individuals, they are less prone than non-anxious individuals to spontaneously 
elaborate on episodic simulations, and they do not find positive EFT easier to simulate over 
time, a benefit that healthy individuals do get from repeated simulation. These findings also 
lend support to the notion that worry and EFT are distinct processes, given the excess of the 
former and relative deficit in the latter in the GAD group.
With regard to perceived plausibility of future events, we found that individuals with GAD 
selectively rated negative events as more likely than did non-anxious individuals, consistent 
with our second hypothesis. This particular pattern of findings helps to corroborate previous 
research in anxious, but non-clinical, samples (Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquin, 2008). We 
extend those previous findings by using novel future events, which controls for previous 
experience with experimental stimuli (i.e., previous worrying about those specific events), 
by ensuring that future thinking was episodic in nature, and by using a clinical sample.
Results did not support our hypothesis regarding group differences in how repeated 
simulation would affect plausibility ratings. We had predicted that individuals with GAD 
would experience a larger increase in perceived plausibility of negative events upon 
repeated simulation, relative to controls. The data showed the reverse pattern, albeit without 
reaching statistical significance. That is, controls rated negative events as slightly more 
plausible if they simulated them repeatedly than if they only simulated them once, but those 
with GAD did not show this repetition effect. This pattern may be driven by the controls’ 
higher level of engagement with the episodic simulations (i.e., greater levels of detail and 
ease), which led them to perceive the greater vividness in repeatedly simulated events as 
greater plausibility. The GAD group, by contrast, may have not experienced negative events 
as increasingly plausible after repetition because they were not increasingly vivid. In fact, 
exploratory correlation analyses found a correlation between plausibility ratings and detail/
ease ratings, and further, between the change in plausibility ratings and detail/ease ratings. 
However, to test the effect of vividness of EFTs on their perceived plausibility, further 
exploration through experimental manipulation is needed.
Overall, the above findings suggest that when it comes to simulating the future, those with 
GAD demonstrate relatively less ability to engage in vivid EFT, and/or a relative lack of 
cognitive flexibility across repeated cognitive events, especially if the hypothetical event is 
positive. This, combined with a tendency to rate negative episodic future events as more 
plausible, may contribute to the clinical features of GAD. Importantly, these findings 
suggest that elements other than worry play a role in the cognitive-affective milieu of GAD, 
and lends support to the view that worry and EFT are two distinct cognitive processes in this 
disorder. While those with GAD demonstrate more worry than healthy individuals, they 
actually engage less in some ways in episodic future simulations.
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Limitations of the present findings include their reliance on subjective self-reports. Future 
investigations could benefit from multi-method assessment of participants’ emotional-
cognitive responses to episodic simulation of future events. Psychophysiological measures 
of arousal may supplement self-reported Likert scales, which would serve not only to 
corroborate ratings, but also to highlight any meaningful discrepancies between subjective 
and objective measures of emotional response. For example, the lack of predicted group 
differences in subjective arousal ratings in the present findings may be occluding relatively 
lower physiological arousal in the GAD group—anxious individuals may have been more 
sensitive to changes in bodily sensations, and interpreted them as more arousing than their 
healthy counterparts. Another limitation is that depressive symptoms were not considered in 
the analyses. Although both groups were allowed to have depressive symptoms for inclusion 
in the study, and no participants in either group met diagnostic criteria for a mood disorder 
at the time of participation, there is a possibility that the GAD group harbored more 
depressive symptoms than the control group, which may have influenced EFT outcomes. 
Similar consideration should be given to the potential influence of comorbid anxiety 
symptoms (e.g., social anxiety), especially in the context of simulating interpersonal future 
events. Future work should quantify depressive symptoms and other anxiety disorders in 
more detail in order to consider their role as a possible moderator. Lastly, given the lack of 
consistent results for all outcome variables (e.g., no findings for arousal ratings) in the 
predicted patterns, replication is needed to corroborate findings, ideally with larger sample 
sizes that will allow identification of subgroups and moderating variables.
Future studies, in addition to addressing the above limitations and exploring the relationship 
between future simulations’ vividness and plausibility, should explore the potential 
relevance of these findings to clinical practice. Cognitive-behavioral therapy for GAD often 
includes imaginal exposure, an exercise in which patients vividly simulate the worst case 
future scenarios in order to decatastrophize those hypothetical events (Borkovec & Costello, 
1993; Ouimet, Covin, & Dozois, 2012). For GAD patients to receive the full benefit from 
imaginal exposures, clinicians should be aware that they may not be simulating the scenario 
as vividly as they could, and should continually assess the patient's ability to engage. 
Moreover, because imagery has a more powerful impact on emotions than do verbal 
material (Holmes & Mathews, 2005), the imagery rescripting literature posits that the best 
way to modify negative cognition is not just through verbal challenge, but by using positive 
imagery to transform intrusive negative imagery and counteract negative schemas (for a 
review, see Holmes, Arntz & Smucker, 2007). The efficacy of this technique has been 
demonstrated in posttraumatic stress disorder (Grunert et al., 2007; Arntz, Kindt & Tiesema, 
2007), social phobia (Wild, Hackmann & Clark, 2007), major depressive disorder (Wheatley 
et al., 2007) and other disorders (reviewed in Holmes, Arntz & Smucker, 2007). However, 
there is currently little emphasis on practicing positive imagery in GAD. In the context of 
the main treatment goal (i.e., reducing worry), introducing positive simulations could help to 
maintain treatment gains by: a) teaching patients how to engage in concrete and detailed 
positive future simulations, which take up mental space for what would otherwise be filled 
with abstract, verbal loop-based worry; and b) increasing positive affect overall and 
challenging negative schemas using imagery, which more strongly affects emotions than do 
verbal thoughts (Holmes, Arntz & Smucker, 2007). Developing a further understanding of 
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the nature and limits of positive cognition in GAD will continue to aid in its clinical 
conceptualization and intervention development.
5. Conclusions
In summary, the present study is the first to assess the ability of individuals with GAD to 
construct episodic simulations of idiosyncratic future events. Using the experimental 
recombination procedure, we demonstrated that individuals with GAD are less likely than 
their non-anxious counterparts to spontaneously add detail when repeatedly simulating 
future events, and do not find positive events increasingly easy to simulate as their non-
anxious counterparts do. They also selectively rated negative events as more likely than did 
healthy individuals, without any confounds from past worrying. This finding advances our 
understanding of future-oriented cognitive processing in GAD and may have implications 
for clinical practice.
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Highlights
There is little knowledge of episodic future thinking (EFT) in GAD
• Examined simulations of novel future events in GAD and control participants
• GAD participants spontaneously added less detail to EFT than did controls
• GAD group showed negative bias in ease of generating EFT, perception of 
plausibility
Wu et al. Page 14
J Anxiety Disord. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 December 01.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Figure 1. Difference in detail ratings between repeated and non-repeated events
Mean difference between repeated and non-repeated future simulations in ratings of detail. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. CONTROL = Healthy controls. GAD = 
Generalized anxiety disorder.
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Figure 2. Difference in ease ratings between repeated and non-repeated events
Mean difference between repeated and non-repeated future simulations in ratings of ease of 
simulation, for positive, negative, and neutral events. Error bars represent standard errors of 
the mean. CONTROL = Healthy controls. GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder.
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Figure 3. Plausibility ratings by group and emotion of simulated event
Mean ratings of plausibility for positive, negative, and neutral events as a function of group 
membership. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. CONTROL = Healthy 
controls. GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder.
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Table 1
Demographic characteristics of patients with GAD and healthy control participants
GAD Controls Total sample
n 21 19 40
Age 25.67 (11.23) 28.42 (12.35) 27.45 (11.66)
% female 71.40% 68.40% 70.00%
BAI 16.43 (8.23) 2.74 (3.25)
PSWQ 65.86 (7.42) 39.50 (8.88)
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Controls = healthy controls. GAD = patients with generalized anxiety disorder. The GAD 
group had higher scores on the Beck Anxiety Index (BAI) than did the healthy control group, t(38) = 6.79, p < .001). GAD participants also 
reported more worry on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) than did controls, t(37) = 10.10, p < .001, 95% CI [21.94, 30.77], d = 2.968.
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